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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the issue of family ownership for Indonesian companies through a detailed 
analysis of the ‘ultimate’ share control. A key finding in this study is that ownership type directly im-
pacts on economic performance for Indonesian companies. There are distinct and dramatic differences 
between the higher return on assets (7.37%) for non-family firms as compared to the far lower profit 
(1.56%) figures by family-controlled firms. The evidence raises concerns about possible profit manipula-
tion and the entrenchment of profits.  
 
Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the potential im-
pact of concentrated ownership and family own-
ership structures on corporate economic per-
formance. The setting is Indonesia, a country 
where high family corporate ownership is not 
only seen but is the normal situation for most 
listed companies. Major questions arise from 
such circumstances. How is economic perform-
ance affected by ownership structures? Is there 
an expropriation of wealth to the majority and 
family-related shareholders whilst disadvantag-
ing the minority and non-family holders?  
 
Ownership Structure and the Agency 
Problem 
 
One important issue in the organization 
of firms is how to solve or mitigate the agency 
problem that derives from asymmetric informa-
tion. The nature of a corporation's ownership 
structure will affect the nature of the agency 
problems between managers and outside share-
holders, and among shareholders. But the prob-
lems that arise when firm ownership is dispersed 
are different to those that arise when it is con-
centrated. When ownership is diffused, as is 
typical for U.S., U.K., and Japan corporations, 
conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders are a central problem (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). However, when ownership is 
concentrated to the degree that one owner has 
effective control of the firm, as is typically the 
case for firms in Western Europe and the most 
of Asia, conflicts of interest between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders be-
comes the main problem (Fan and Wong 2002). 
 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) in-
vestigate the separation of ownership in selected 
Asian countries. Their findings indicate that con-
trolling a single shareholder is prevalent in more 
than two-thirds of the firms in the countries they 
studied while the separation of management 
from ownership control was rare. Thus, in Asian 
countries owners have significant power to pur-
sue their own interests at the expense of minor-
ity shareholders, creditors and other stake-
holders. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, 
controlling shareholders might not have a con-
vergence of interests with minority shareholders. 
Gaining effective control of a corporation en-
ables the controlling owner to determine not just 
how the company is run, but also how profits are 
shared among shareholders. Although minority 
shareholders are supposedly entitled to cash 
flow rights proportional to their share of equity 
ownership, they face the uncertainty that an en-
trenched controlling owner may opportunisti-
cally deprive them of their rights. This creates an 
‘entrenchment effect’ (Morck et al. 1988). 
Higher managerial ownership might entrench 
managers, as they are increasingly less subject to 
governance mechanisms (Chang, Hillman, and 
Watson 2005). Separation of ownership rights 
and control rights can worsen the entrenchment 
problems caused by concentrated ownership.  
 
Ownership structure plays an important 
role in corporate governance. It is a key organi-
sation variable influencing firm outcomes (Kang 
and Sorensen 1999). Denis and McConnel 
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(2003) explain that ownership structure refers 
to the identities of a firm’s equity holders and 
the size of their holdings. Following Boubakri, 
Cosset and Guedhami (2005) this study divides 
the shareholding patterns into two major dimen-
sions: the size of ownership (which we further 
group it into majority and non-majority) and the 
identity of ownership (which we  then group it 
into family and non-family ownership).  
 
Large investors tend to primarily repre-
sent their own interests; they will use their con-
trol rights in order to maximise their personal 
utility from the company (Schleifer and Vishny 
1997). This is usually done through paying 
themselves excessive compensation or special 
dividends, appointing family members to man-
agement positions over other better-qualified 
candidates, or involvment in potentially-biased 
related-party transactions (Schleifer and Vishny 
1986; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000; Anderson 
and Reeb 2003). 
 
Empirical findings in regard to the rela-
tionship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance have produced inconclusive 
results. Several studies (e.g., Claessens et al. 
2000; Thomsem and Pedersen 2000; Chen, 
Guo, and Mande 2003) document some support 
for the hypothesis of a positive relation between 
concentrated ownership structure and firm 
value. In contrast, many studies failed to con-
firm a positive association between firm per-
formance and ownership concentration. For ex-
ample, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
and Palia (1999) report that concentrated own-
ership is not associated with better corporate 
performance. 
 
Similar to large shareholders, families 
are more likely to decrease agency costs and in-
crease firm performance due to some reasons. 
Andres (2008) argues that families usually have 
invested a substantial amount of their private 
capital into the firm; therefore they tend to have 
exceptional concerns over company survival and 
strong incentives to supervise corporate man-
agement’s activities. Uniquely, family firms are 
usually run by close family members, thus, it 
may eliminate the potential conflict between 
separate owners and managers (Andres 2008). 
Families are also experienced at creating a con-
ducive working environment that successfully 
fosters trust and loyalty resulting in lower em-
ployment turnover and recruitment costs (Ward 
1988).  Based on arguments above, firms that 
are owned by family members should lead to 
more efficient investment and, as a result, be 
more profitable compared to non-family con-
trolled firms. The potential drawbacks of family 
ownership is that, instead of maximising firm 
value, family controlled firms might have incen-
tives to pursue their private benefits at the ex-
pense of other shareholders and firm perform-
ance (Schleifer and Vishny 1997; Faccio, Lang, 
and Young 2001). It is also posited that families 
are more likely to favor family members by fill-
ing upper management positions and supervi-
sory board positions which lead to competitive 
disadvantages compared to non-family firms 
(Gomez-Meijia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez 
2001; Andres 2008). As consequence of these 
latter issues, an opposite set of expectations can 
be generated; family-owned firms tend to result 
in a negative effect on firm performance.  
 
These conflicting theories have recently 
evoked a number of empirical examinations of 
the association between family ownership and 
firm value. The first set of literature finds a posi-
tive link between family ownership and eco-
nomic performance. Using U.S. Western Europe, 
Chile and German data.  Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, and 
Mishra (1998) , Maury (2006) and Martinez, 
Stohr, and Quiroga (2007) and Ehrhardt, Nowak 
and Weber (2004) note that families businesses 
are more profitable than non-family companies.  
 
In contrast, the second set of literature 
notes an inverse relationship between family 
ownership and performance. For istance, Claes-
sens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) using a 
sample of firms from Southeast Asian countries, 
find that family firms’ financial performance 
underperform relative to non-family controlled 
firms. Similar results are also reported by Cron-
qvist and Nilsson (2003).  
 
Indonesia, with its very large component 
of high family ownership and weak regulatory 
systems, is the perfect setting to explore this po-
tential complicating relationship between family 
ownership and economic performance.  
 
Research Approach 
 
This project utilises a positivist empiri-
cal quantitative research paradigm to answer 
questions concerning ‘what ‘ is the level of eco-
nomic performance of Indonesian listed compa-
nies and ‘why’ varying ownership structures ex-
plain this performance?  
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To ensure data homogeneity, this study 
is limited to manufacturing companies identified 
by the Indonesian Capital Market Directory 
(ICMD). Another key reason to choose manufac-
turing firms is that this sector is dominant in 
Asia and especially Indonesia. As Dhawan, Man-
galeswaran, Sankhe, Schween and Paresh (2000, 
p. 42)  states: “Asia has become the workshop of 
the world: more than half of all manufacturing 
on Earth is estimated to take place there. The 
sample examined in this study comprises all 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indone-
sia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the longitudinal 
period 2003 to 2006. There are a total of 166 
manufacturing firms listed on the IDX as at the 
financial statement date 31 December 2006. 
However, because of company non-disclosure, 
we are unable to collect sufficient information to 
construct a full set of proxy measures for 61 enti-
ties; therefore, the final usable sample consists 
of 105 firms.  
 
This study examines the economic per-
formance of manufacturing firms listed in IDX 
for the accounting years 2003 to 2006 using the 
ownership structure as the key predictor. Per-
formance is measured using the most fre-
quently-used indicator: rate of return on assets 
(ROA). ROA is defined as a ratio of net income 
to total assets. ROE is the division of net income 
by shareholders’ equity.  To measure the degree 
of control, this study combines shareholdings 
registered in the name of the majority share-
holder and other related shareholders (i.e. 
through shares held by individuals, family or 
companies that, in turn, are under his/her con-
trol). This procedure is the best approach since 
in Indonesia the majority of the companies listed 
on the capital market are family controlled. Fol-
lowing Claessens et al. (2000), we use the family 
group as the unit of analysis. By identifying the 
name under which the shares are registered, this 
study delineates their family affiliation.  
 
Ownership structure refers to the identi-
ties of a firm’s equity holders and the size of 
their holdings (Denis and McConnel 2003). 
Thus, there are two key dimensions of owner-
ship structure: ownership concentration (owner-
ship type) and the identity of owners (Boubakri 
et al. 2005). Following Murali and Welch (1989) 
and Holderness and Sheehan (1988), this study 
categorises ownership concentration as either: 
majority ownership; or non-majority ownership. 
Majority ownership is defined if one owner (per-
son, family, family’s company), the government 
(local or national), or a foreign multinational 
owns > 50% of the shares in a company. A 
dummy variable is used to categorise firms, set 
equal to one if a firm has a majority ownership 
structure and zero otherwise. 
 
Most prior studies of ownership struc-
ture emphasize immediate ownership; that is, 
common shares directly owned by individuals or 
institutions. Fan and Wong (2002) argue that 
immediate ownership is not sufficient for char-
acterizing the ownership and control of Asian 
firms because these firms are generally associ-
ated with complicated indirect ownership struc-
tures. Therefore, this study focuses on the ulti-
mate ownership of companies. The ultimate 
owner is defined as the shareholder who has the 
determining voting rights of the company and 
who is not controlled by anybody else (Fan and 
Wong 2002). The ultimate ownership structures 
are computed consistent with existing studies 
(Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Claes-
sens et al. 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002) that 
carefully traced the chain of ownership and iden-
tified the ultimate owner(s) that controlled the 
most voting rights (the controlling share-
holder(s) by summing their direct and indirect 
ownership (voting rights) in a company. In many 
cases, the immediate shareholders of a firm are 
themselves corporate entities, or investment 
companies and other legal entities (Yeh 2005). 
This study then identifies their owners, the own-
ers of their owners, etc. Following Fan and 
Wong (2002) economisation of the data collec-
tion, the ultimate owner’s voting rights level is 
set at 50% and not traced any further once that 
level is reached.  
 
This study defines family ownership 
where an individual, or group of family mem-
bers, holds more than 20% of a firm’s shares 
(voting rights) and is the largest controlling 
block in the company. The use of the 20% cut-off 
point has also been adopted by prior researchers 
such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999) study of corporate ownership in 27 coun-
tries and Claessens et al. (2000) investigation of 
company ownership in nine East Asian countries 
including Indonesia. La Porta et al. (1999), for 
example, argue that the idea behind using a 20% 
cut-off is that “this is usually enough to have ef-
fective control of a firm” (p. 477). Moreover, ac-
cording to the Indonesian Capital Market Law 
(Article (1) 1995 a person that directly or indi-
rectly holds at least 20% of the voting rights of a 
company is called a ‘substantial shareholder’. 
Similar to La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et 
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al. (2002), we use the family as the unit of 
analysis. Family ownership also covers the own-
ership interests of family members beyond their 
surnames (i.e. it includes blood and marriage 
ties) and families are assumed to own and vote 
collectively. A company is then classified accord-
ing to data extracted from the ICMD, IBDC, and 
INFORDEV publications, and firm’s prospec-
tuses. A dummy variable is used to identify the 
firms and is set equal to one if a firm is consid-
ered to be family owned (controlled) and zero 
otherwise. 
 
To control for compounding influences 
of cross-sectional factors, this study includes 
auditor type, size and leverage as control vari-
ables in the regression analysis. The perceived 
quality of the auditor is considered to be a possi-
ble determinant of the firm financial perform-
ance (e.g., Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; 
Gul, Chen, and Tsui 2003). Prior research usu-
ally distinguishes between non-Big 4 and Big 4 
audit firms arguing the latter to be of a higher 
quality than the former (Heninger 2001; 
Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). This study includes 
Big 4 as a control for perceived auditor quality. 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if 
the firm’s auditor in fiscal year t is a Big 4 ac-
counting firm; otherwise scored zero (0). A 
study concerning a nexus between firms’ charac-
teristics and their financial performance con-
ducted by Kakani and Kaul (2002) concludes 
that the firm size is an important factor influenc-
ing its financial performance. Size is calculated 
as the natural logarithm of the total assets. Lev-
erage is included as prior studies show that fi-
nancing decisions might influence the firm’s 
profitability (Graham 2000; Booth, Aivazian, 
Demiguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2001). We de-
fine Leverage as ratio of book value total liabili-
ties to book value total assets.  
 
Descriptive and Statistical Analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1, Panels A and B, provides the de-
scriptive statistics for the dependent, independ-
ent and control variables. Panel A shows the de-
scriptive statistics for the continuous variables 
and Panel B the categorical figures. 
 
      Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Panel A – Continuous variables 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ROA (%) 3.66 2.45 10.31 -32.51 44.89 
Size(million rupiah) 2,559,980 575,781 7,014,880 28,380 48,907,132 
Leverage (%) 64.61 54.78 51.30 12.99 334.44 
      
Panel B – Categorical variables 
 
  
 
Frequency Percent-
age 
Owner Type      
Majority    66 62.86 
Non-majority    39 37.14 
Owner Identity      
Family    67 63.81 
Non-family    38 36.19 
Auditor Type      
Big 4    62 59.05 
Non-Big 4    43 40.95 
Legend: (N = 105). ROA: Ratio of net income to total assets Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets. Leverage: Ratio of total li-
abilities to total assets. Owner Type: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if one owner (person, family, family’s company), 
the government (local or national), or a foreign multinational has a majority ownership (more than 50% of the shares in a company); 
otherwise scored zero (0). Owner Identity: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if an individual or group of family members, 
holds more than 20% of a firm’s shares (voting rights) and is the largest controlling block in the company; otherwise scored zero (0) 
Auditor Type: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if a company’s auditor is a Big-4 audit firm for at least: three out of four 
year periods or last two years; otherwise scored zero (0). 
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Panel A in Table 2 indicates that the average 
of ROA performance measure was low at 3.66% 
and a median of an even lower 2.45%. The size of 
the companies that are included in the sample 
has a mean of IDR2,599,980 million with a 
range of IDR28,380 to IDR48,907,132 million. 
Average total liabilities to total assets ratio (Lev-
erage) of the sample firms is 64.61%.  In relation 
to the ownership structure observed across the 
sample firms, Panel B of the table indicated that 
62.86% of firms are controlled by the owners 
who have a majority ownership (more than 50% 
of a company’s outstanding share). Panel B also 
shows that 63.81% of firms are owned by an in-
dividual or group of family members. This is 
consistent with Claessens et al. (2000) finding 
that Indonesian ownership concentration is 
higher than most other countries, with the major 
shareholders controlling 61.70% of all corpora-
tions. Finally, 59.05% of firms hired a Big 4 au-
dit firm as their auditor. This figure is slightly 
higher than the case of Australian and signifi-
cantly lower compared to Singaporean. In the 
Australian capital market, 57.54% of firms use a 
service of the Big 4; while majority of Singapor-
ean firms (86.38%) are audited by the Big 4 ac-
counting firms (Rusmin, Van der Zahn, Tower, 
and Brown 2006). 
 
Multivariate analysis 
 
The main results for testing the impact 
of large concentrated ownership and family-
controlled ownership are reported in Table 2. A 
correlation matrix (not shown for brevity) re-
veals that there is no significant correlation 
amongst the two independent variables.  
 
Table 2: Results of multivariate regression  
 t-stat Sig. 
(Constant) 0.920 0.360 
Owner Type -0.893 0.328 
Owner Identity -2.089 0.039 
Auditor Type 1.923 0.057 
Size 0.742 0.460 
Leverage -6.666 0.000 
Model Summary  
F-statistic 15.515 0.000 
R-Square 0.439 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.411 
Sample Size 105 
Legend:ROA: Ratio of net income to total assets. Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets. Leverage: Ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets Owner Type: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if one owner (person, family, family’s company), the govern-
ment (local or national), or a foreign multinational has a majority ownership (more than 50% of the shares in a company); otherwise 
scored zero (0) Owner Identity: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if an individual or group of family members, holds more 
than 20% of a firm’s shares (voting rights) and is the largest controlling block in the company; otherwise scored zero (0). Auditor 
Type: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if a company’s auditor is a Big-4 audit firm for at least: three out of four year peri-
ods or last two years; otherwise scored zero (0). 
 
Regression model estimates reported in 
Table 2 is statistically significant (F-statistic 
p<0.01), with an adjusted R-squared of 41.1%. 
The coefficient on Owner Type is negative but 
statistically insignificant. This finding is in 
consistent with Demzetz and Lehn (1985), 
Demzetz and Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) results but contrary to the several 
past studies which suggest that the 
concentration of shareholders is significantly 
and positively related to firm performance 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Boubakri et al. 
2005). The finding also fails to confirm that 
highly concentrated ownership firms are less 
productive than firms with widely dispersed 
ownership structures (Schleifer and Vishny 
and Vishny 1986; Schleifer and Vishny 1997; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000). Thus, the evi-
dence does not support the notion that a higher 
level of ownership concentration influences a 
firm’s financial performance. The coefficient on 
Owner Identity is negative and significant (at p-
value 0.039). This result suggests that the pres-
ence of high concentrated shareholdings by fam-
ily members might lower corporate perform-
ance. Our finding supports the notion that fam-
ily control may harm firm performance as re-
ported by Faccio et al.  (2001) in the case of East 
Asian firms, Claessens et al. (2002) in Southeast 
Asia,  Cronqvist and Neilsson (2003) and Barth 
et al. (2005) both in Sweden and Norway capital 
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markets respectively and Saito (2008) for the 
Japanese family firms both owned and managed 
by the founder’s descendants. However, our data 
regarding the relationship between accounting 
performance and family controlled firms is con-
trary to several previous research, for example, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), McCanaughy et al. 
(1998), Maury (2006), Martinez et al. (2007).  A 
backward regression (not shown for brevity) 
with the best estimation model confirms that 
Owner Identity, Auditor Type and Leverage are 
significant predictors of firms’ financial per-
formance (at p-values of 0.026, 0,023 and 0.000 
respectively).  
 
Further analysis using Independent 
Samples T-Tests (see Table 3) reveals that the 
significant association between Owner Identity 
and ROA is driven by the presence of owners in 
non family-controlled firms. As shown in Table 
3, the average return on assets for non-family 
firms (7.89%) is significantly higher compared to 
the mean of return on assets earned by the fam-
ily controlled firms (1.26%).  These differences 
are dramatic. This result is wholly consistent 
with the argument that family firms tend to act 
in the interest of family members, which leads to 
expropriate wealth from the non-families share-
holders (Gomez-Meijia et al. 2001; Villalonga 
and Amit 2006). However, this finding clearly 
does not support the idea that family businesses 
perform better compared to non-family firms as 
documented by, for example, Martinez et al. 
(2007) and Anderson and Reeb (2003). Auditor 
Type is also positively and significantly (at p-
value of 0.057) related with ROA. This finding 
supports the widely accepted conjecture that Big 
4 auditors provide a high quality audit. Findings 
reported in numerous studies document that the 
Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audit than 
those non-Big 4 auditors (e.g., Becker et al. 
1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Gore, 
Pope, and Singh 2001; Krishnan 2003). Table 3 
shows that the average return on assets of com-
panies audited by Big 4 auditors (6.59%) is sig-
nificantly higher than average rate of return of 
non-Big 4 clients (-0.56%). 
 
     Table 3: Descriptive statistics – Owner identity 
ROA 
 
 
N 
Mean SD t-value Sig 
Family 67 1.26 9.67 3.316 0.001 
Non-family 38 7.89 10.15   
 105     
Big 4 62 6.59 9.78 -3.704 0.000 
Non-Big 4 43 -0.56 9.65   
 105     
 
Finally, the coefficient on Leverage is 
negative and highly significant at p-value of 
0.000. This result supports the argument that 
debt financing decisions might have a negative 
impact on firm’s financial performance. The di-
rectional sign and statistical result for Leverage 
is consistent with previous works (e.g., Friend 
and Lang 1988; Wald 1999; Booth et al. 2001; 
Abor 2005). Those studies examine the effects of 
firm leverage and profitability and conclude that 
a significantly negative association between 
profitability and debt to total assets ratio. Size is 
positively but insignificantly associated with 
firm financial performance. Geroski, Machin and 
Walters (1997) examine the association between 
firm size and profitability on large U.K. compa-
nies and report that growth rates of the compa-
nies are random over the time, thus, difficult to 
predict.  
Conclusions 
 
A key finding in this study is that owner-
ship type directly impacts on economic perform-
ance for Indonesian companies. There are dis-
tinct and dramatic differences between the aver-
age return on assets for non-family firms 
(7.89%) as compared to the far lower earned by 
the family firms (1.26%). These results raise im-
portant questions. Have profit figures been ma-
nipulated by these controlling family entities? 
Are minority owners disadvantaged? Our results 
show a very possible ‘entrenchment effect’ 
wherein the controlling owner dictates not just 
how the company operates, but also how profits 
are shared among shareholders. Arguably, mi-
nority shareholders are entitled to cash flow 
rights proportional to their share of equity own-
ership, yet they face the uncertainty that an en-
trenched controlling owner may opportunisti-
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cally deprive them of their rights. Our finding of 
far lower reported profits for these family con-
trolled entities adds credence to the concerns 
about inequitable distributions and entrenched 
profits.  
 
Our result also shows a positive and sig-
nificant association between Big 4 audit firms 
and firm accounting performance, a result inter-
preted as evidence of Big 4 auditors may provide 
higher quality audit than non-Big 4 auditors. 
Finally, we find a significant negative relation-
ship between leverage and economic perform-
ance. Lower leverage firms have far higher prof-
its. This relationship may be a remnant of the 
financial shock suffered by Indonesian compa-
nies during and after the ‘Asian Currency Crisis’. 
Indonesian companies are still reeling from high 
inflation, very low exchange rates and uncertain 
government policies.  
 
The Indonesian financial market is re-
plete with family-controlled businesses. This 
leads to concerns about the equitable treatment 
of minority and small shareholders. Is the play-
ing field balanced? Our findings lead one to the 
conclusion that they are not equitable or bal-
anced. The evidence raises concerns about pos-
sible profit manipulation and the entrenchment 
of profits. Government policy may need to be 
changed and more stringent regulations intro-
duced to improve investor confidence and better 
protect minority shareholder rights. 
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